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The resilience of post market infrastructures and payment systems
Payment and securities clearing and settlement systems play an important role in ensuring the safe and
efficient transfer of deposits and financial instruments. Their smooth functioning is therefore essential to
financial stability.
The operational risk faced by these infrastructures has accordingly been attracting much attention for a
number of years, and this has resulted in the implementation of “business continuity plans” (BCP), designed
to ensure their soundness in various failure scenarios.
In most financial centres, business continuity plans are being redesigned with a view to strengthening
them. This article presents the rationale for strengthening BCPs (section 1), the challenges to be taken up
in order to achieve this (section 2) and the main initiatives already taken to meet these challenges (section 3).
1| THE NEED TO STRENGTHEN
BUSINESS CONTINUITY PLANS
Why are business continuity plans
important?
The total annual value of transactions processed
through payment and securities clearing and
settlement systems in G10 countries represents over
ten times the value of GDP. In this context, it is
essential for the smooth functioning of the financial
system as a whole that these infrastructures include
business continuity procedures in order to ensure a
continuity of service in the event of the failure of
one of their components or of a third party provider
(telecommunications, electric supply, etc.), or
should the staff in charge of operating the
infrastructures be unavailable.
Both the system operators and the authorities in
charge of their regulation and oversight have long
been aware of the importance of business continuity
plans. It has more recently become a growing
concern as a result of the significant changes in the
way in which systems are designed and operated.
These changes, which have highlighted the need
for an appropriate management of operational risk,
result essentially from:
• the spreading of real-time processing;
• the growing complexity and sophistication of
technologies used;
• the outsourcing of key functions;
• the growing interdependence between securities
settlement systems and payment systems;
• the materialisation of high impact / low probability
risks (e.g. acts of terrorism, total and lasting
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In the early 1990s, central banks started to develop
minimum standards for the design and operation of
interbank netting schemes (Lamfalussy report). One
of these is that all netting schemes “should ensure
the operational reliability of technical systems and
the availability of back-up facilities capable of
completing daily processing requirements”. This
standard has, since then, been included in the “Core
Principles for systemically important payment
systems” developed by the CPSS (Committee on
Payment and Settlement Systems of the G10
countries) and in the recommendations of the CPSS
and the IOSCO (International Organisation of
Securities Commissions) for securities clearing and
settlement systems.
In response to these guidelines set by public
authorities, system operators have adopted
measures to strengthen the resilience of their
infrastructures in line with users’ expectations. This
has been confirmed by the results of the regular
assessments performed by central banks against the
standards mentioned above. For example, the
assessments of all the euro-denominated large value
payment systems performed by the Eurosystem
central banks against the “Core Principles for
systemically important payment systems” have
highlighted the systems’ high level of compliance
with regard to operational risk management.1
The limitations
of the current arrangements
Changes in the design and operation of the systems
have contributed to making system operators and
the authorities in charge of their regulation and
oversight more aware of the importance of business
continuity plans, but they have also pinpointed the
limitations of the current arrangements. The events
of 11 September 2001 highlighted the resilience of
the US financial system as a whole, but also brought
to light several weaknesses, among which:
• a too narrow conception of the possible incident
scenarios and, in particular, a failure to take into
consideration major risks (earthquakes, floods,
terrorist attacks), which are likely to cause severe
disruptions or destruction across a large geographic
area or to prevent the qualified staff from accessing
the systems they are in charge of operating. This
may result in an insufficient geographic diversity
of production/processing sites on which numerous
business continuity plans rely;
• an underestimation of the business continuity plans’
dependence either on third party providers of shared
backup arrangements, which might be unable to meet
the needs of all their clients at the same time, or on
telecommunication networks, which are likely to be
using the same physical networks and may turn out
to be unexpected single points of failure;
• insufficient checks of the compatibility of
individual continuity plans, given that industry-wide
testing of contingency and business continuity
arrangements – including participants – is not a
common practice in the financial sector.
2| THE MAIN CHALLENGES
TO BE TAKEN UP
In the light of past experiences and the weaknesses
which have been identified, it appears essential to
strengthen the resilience of market infrastructures.
It is not obvious, however, what are the best ways
to meet this objective, as the parties involved all
face a number of difficult challenges.
What are the scenarios to be prepared for?
Defining a business continuity plan is a complex
process, which often involves a large number of
departments within the same organisation and
usually relies on a comprehensive analysis of the risks
faced by a company, a business line, an entity or a
process. It is essential to properly identify the crisis
scenarios to be taken into consideration because this
ensures that the business continuity arrangements
are in accord with the risks actually incurred.
Some scenarios have been receiving much attention
from infrastructure operators for a number of years,
and in particular those scenarios which are unlikely
to have knock-on effects, such as a fire on a
processing/production site, the destruction of a
1 See ECB publication “Assessment of euro large-value payment systems against the Core principles”, May 2004, http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/
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building or a hardware or software crash. For this
type of scenario, operators have usually already
developed appropriate, well-tested procedures, such
as the duplication of sensitive data on a backup site.
At the other end of the spectrum, some scenarios are
likely to have such a damaging effect that ensuring
the continuity of payment and settlement systems is
unlikely to be high on the list of priorities of both
authorities and operators. A nuclear accident (or
attack) would, naturally, be such a case. The difficult
issue for both the system operators and the authorities
in charge of their regulation and oversight is hence
to work out what point to aim for on the risk scale.
Since it is impossible to make an inventory of and to
assess all possible scenarios, especially new scenarios,
by trying to “think the unthinkable”, a different approach
would be to focus, not on specific scenarios, but rather
on a few typical consequences which could result from
a wide range of crisis situations (e.g. a failure of the
electric power network, the telecommunications
networks or the transport systems, etc.), and to consider
the relevant responses. The best possible preparatory
work may, however, be to test these typical
consequences against a limited number of specific
scenarios, in order to assess how they would fit in with
each other and work out in the event of a real crisis.
Where should the backup site be located?
The search for a higher level of resilience in the event
of a major widespread disruption has called into
question the traditional model on which many business
continuity plans were based. According to this model,
the distance between the primary and the backup sites
is small in order to cut down relocation time of key
staff to the backup site in the event of a disaster. Taking
major disaster scenarios into consideration implies
making sure that the primary and backup sites cannot
become simultaneously unavailable on account of the
same event. Accordingly, they should present different
“risk profiles” and should not be dependent on the
same infrastructure components (transport,
telecommunications, etc.) or labour pool. It is therefore
essential that the primary and backup sites be
sufficiently far apart to fulfil this objective. What is a
sufficient distance? Several elements should be taken
into account when trying to answer this question.
First, the minimum distance between sites depends
greatly on the type of crisis scenario. The “traditional”
approach, which tends to limit the distance between
both sites, is an appropriate solution in the case of
crises whose impact is confined to single buildings
(following a fire for example). It is, however, unlikely
to be a suitable option in the event of an earthquake
which would destroy or damage all the buildings
across a large area.
There are also technological constraints which de facto
limit the distance between the primary and the backup
sites beyond which it is not possible to synchronously
mirror the data.2  This is approximately 100 kilometres.
Although it can reasonably be expected that
technological progress will eventually extend this limit,
this constraint is still real today and any entity making
plans to ensure the continuity of its operations has to
take it into consideration. The method for replicating
data is a key parameter in the recovery or resumption
time objective. Indeed, only synchronous mirroring
ensures that, at any point in time, the data on both the
primary site and the backup site are identical. This
allows a quicker recovery and resumption of operations
in the event of an incident, because the system operator
is not required to recover the data already processed
on the primary site but not yet copied on the backup
site (this phase is usually called “resynchronisation of
data”). A trade off is therefore made between the
minimum distance and the data replication method
(hence recovery and resumption time).
Another fundamental issue is the availability of
qualified and trained staff to operate the backup
site. Indeed, it seems rather unrealistic to consider
relocating staff from the primary site to the
backup site under any circumstances. A “simple”
solution could be to duplicate teams and maintain
“shadow” management and operational capacities
on the backup site, but it obviously raises the
issues of cost and of staff motivation. There is
probably no “one size fits all” strategy to cope with
this problem in a satisfactory manner. Some firms,
in particular major international firms, already
operate several production sites and may
therefore find it easier to implement cost effective
business continuity arrangements than other
firms that have concentrated their operations on
a single production site.
2 Synchronous mirroring means that data transmitted to the primary site is immediately mirrored (in a fraction of a second) on the backup site and
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Overall, the appropriate distance between the
primary and the backup sites depends greatly on the
type of scenario, on the critical functions identified
and on the recovery and resumption objectives for
each of the critical functions. It is therefore not
possible to determine ex ante the proper location of
the backup site. It must be defined along with the
objectives of the business continuity plan.
Which players should be involved?
Recognising external dependencies vis-à-vis third
parties (counterparties, infrastructures or service
providers) is an essential part of a business continuity
plan. The specificity of the financial system is that it
represents a chain of interdependent components,
which is only as strong as its weakest link. In the
event of a major disaster, there is no point for a single
participant in an infrastructure of being able to rapidly
recover and resume its operations if the infrastructure
operator and/or its usual counterparts are not able
to do so. This analysis pleads in favour of a necessary
co-ordination of the business continuity plans of all
the players involved. It can, for example, draw on
industry-wide testing of business continuity and
contingency arrangements. In these tests, several
players simultaneously fall back onto their backup
sites (or more precisely operate from the start of the
day on their backup site). These co-ordinated tests
aim to ensure the compatibility of individual recovery
and resumption arrangements and to validate the
underlying assumptions, such as the capacity of third
party vendors which provide shared backup
arrangements to meet all of their clients’ requests at
the same time. By bringing to light possible
interdependencies not yet identified, they complete
the regular individual testing conducted within each
institution.
It should be noted that this co-operation will be even
more effective if it is part of a regulatory framework
which facilitates the convergence of policy objectives
and an efficient sharing of information among the
authorities concerned (regulators, banking
supervisors, system overseers), both at the national
and the international level. This framework should
also be broad enough to encompass the
telecommunications networks. All players actually
emphasize their high degree of reliance on the
smooth functioning of these networks, despite the
fact that network providers are not regulated (or
overseen) either by central banks or by banking
supervisors, as they do not have any formal
responsibility in this area.
Where to draw the limit?
A broad consensus exists among both public
authorities (in charge of regulation and oversight)
and operators and users of infrastructures to
strengthen current business continuity plans so as
to enhance the resilience of the financial system as
a whole, especially in the event of a major
disruption. A number of factors have, however, to
be taken into account for this objective to be achieved
in the most efficient way.
First, the existence of negative externalities naturally
leads, in the absence of external constraints, to a
situation of under-investment by the various players.
Indeed, within each firm, decisions to invest with a
view to strengthening the resilience of its
infrastructure do not take into account the potential
losses that other firms would incur in the event of
its failure (these losses are not “internalised”). Also,
given the intense competition that prevails in the
financial sector, no firm is prepared to spend
significantly more money than its competitors on
business continuity. This investment would mean
either higher production costs and lower margins
or a loss of customers. The result of the trade-off
between these different elements is an overall level
of investment aimed at ensuring the resilience of
market infrastructures that is lower than the socially
optimal level.
Second, some measures may turn out to be
particularly costly and it may be counterproductive
to require that they be implemented without taking
account of the global environment in which the
relevant players operate. Security and efficiency
cannot actually be totally dissociated. For example,
to strengthen its resilience, an infrastructure may
have to make significant investments and raise its
fees to a level which would encourage participants
to look for cheaper but riskier solutions. It is therefore
essential that the systems which offer the highest
levels of protection remain financially attractive.
To this end, due consideration should be given to the
relevant players’ investment cycles. For those systems
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and that are planning new continuity arrangements,
it may not necessarily be very costly to take into
account possible new requirements stemming from
public authorities at an early stage of the project. For
others, which – for example – have just made a large
investment in a new processing centre that does not
fully meet these new requirements, achieving full
observance within a short time-frame may necessitate
overly expensive investments.
Finally, considering their high degree of
interdependence, the initiatives taken by the
relevant players should be well synchronised. The
financial system as a whole will not become more
resilient if only a small number of infrastructures
improve their business continuity, while the
others do not. Given that all infrastructures do not
have the same level of criticality, it also seems
necessary to rank the constraints they face so as
to make sure that the most critical infrastructures
comply with the tightest recovery and resumption
objectives.
3| THE RESPONSE
OF OPERATORS AND AUTHORITIES
Since the events of 11 September 2001, many
initiatives have been taken by the relevant parties
to strengthen the resilience of critical infrastructures
in the main financial centres. They all aim at
ensuring that sufficient continuity of service is
guaranteed for these infrastructures in the event of
a major disruption.
At the international level
Operational risk is one of the key elements of the
new Basel II Accord. It is now included, along with
credit risk and market risk, in the first pillar of the
framework,  i.e. in the minimum capital
requirements. The new framework allows the
relevant institutions to measure their exposure to
operational risk using several methods. The most
advanced one encourages institutions to develop
systems and practices aimed at reducing their risk
profiles. It also requires them to meet qualitative
criteria, in particular the implementation of a formal
risk management function (pillar 2). The Basel
Committee has also developed sound practices for
the management and supervision of operational risk3
and has, in particular, stressed the necessary
involvement of senior management.
As regards the authorities in charge of regulation
and oversight, numerous exchanges of views on the
resilience of infrastructures have taken place in
international fora, such as the Financial Stability
Forum or the Committee on Payment and
Settlement Systems. Although they have not given
rise to the development of new international
standards, these discussions reflect the strong need
for co-operation, already underlined in the second
part of this article.
The main international infrastructure providers
have also taken initiatives to strengthen their
level of resilience. For example, SWIFT
(Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial
Telecommunications) has launched an ambitious
work program named “Four pillars II”, which
aims to improve the continuity of its network, in
particular in the event that its two operational
centres be simultaneously unavailable. It relied
on an ad hoc committee composed of market
representatives: central banks, commercial banks
and infrastructure operators.
Within the European Union
In 2001, a joint working group of the ESCB
(European System of Central Banks) and the CESR
(Committee of European Securities Regulators), in
consultation with European financial market
participants, started to define the framework for
adapting and implementing the CPSS and IOSCO
recommendations for the organisation, safety and
oversight of securities clearing and settlement
systems at the European level. In particular,
recommendation 11 on operational reliability has
been strengthened in three directions: the
definition of clear recovery and resumption
objectives, the development of business continuity
plans and the formulation of procedures for testing
and updating these plans. When applicable, these
standards (and in particular recommendation 11)
will form the basis of the oversight policy of
European central banks and regulators.
3 Basel Committee on Banking supervision (2003): “Sound practices for the management and supervision of operational risk”, Bank for International
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At the same time, Eurosystem central banks have
started to examine the appropriateness of amending the
current standards for systemically important payment
systems in order to further clarify and strengthen Core
Principle VII, which defines the requirements of the
oversight authorities with regard to business continuity.
This work has led to the drafting of an extended version
of this standard, which aims to ensure a better coverage
of major disruption scenarios. This draft should shortly
be submitted for public consultation.
Moreover, on the initiative of the Eurosystem, a round
table discussion involving central banks, commercial
banks and infrastructure operators should be organised
early 2005. It should promote an exchange of views
and pave the way for the development of a common
policy aimed at strengthening the resilience of the
main European infrastructures.
Without waiting for possible changes in the oversight
standards, system operators have already integrated a
number of new business continuity requirements put
forward by market participants. For example, special
care was given to business continuity issues when
designing the Eurosystem’s future large value payment
system, TARGET2. The planned technical architecture
for the real time settlement of payments is composed
of four operational sites, or more precisely of two pairs
of sites. Data are mirrored synchronously between the
two sites belonging to the same pair. This ensures a
quick recovery and resumption of operations in the
event of an incident whose impact is limited to only
one site. The two pairs are located in different “regions",
far apart from each other. This makes it possible to deal
with major, widespread disasters simultaneously
affecting both sites in a same region. It is also planned
to rotate the operational activities between the two
regions on a regular basis, in order to make sure that
the staff in both regions is properly trained and qualified.
National initiatives
Following the events of 11 September 2001, the first
regulatory and oversight initiatives were taken in
the United States, with the publication in April 2003
of an interagency paper on sound practices to
strengthen the resilience of the US financial system.4
This document outlines three main business
continuity objectives:
• rapid recovery and timely resumption of critical
operations following a wide-scale disruption,
• rapid recovery and timely resumption of critical
operations following the loss or inaccessibility of
staff in at least one major operating location,
• a high level of confidence, though ongoing use of
robust testing, that critical internal and external
continuity arrangements are effective and
compatible.
To this end  the authorities underline four sound
practices which should be given special
consideration:
• identify clearing and settlement activities in
support of critical financial markets,
• determine appropriate recovery and resumption
objectives,
• maintain sufficient geographically dispersed
resources to meet recovery and resumption
objectives,
• routinely use or test recovery and resumption
arrangements.
Recommendations have also been published by
other institutions, such as the Central Bank of Japan,
the Monetary Authority of Hong Kong or the
Monetary Authority of Singapore. In the United
Kingdom, a formal multilateral framework for
co-operation was established in 1997. It enables the
relevant authorities to address issues that may
jeopardise financial stability.5 Following the events
of 11 September 2001, the Standing Committee set
up a sub-group in order to federate the different
initiatives taken by various financial market
institutions to strengthen their resilience.
In France, since 1 July 2004, all credit institutions
and investment firms have been subject to new
requirements regarding risk management and
business continuity plans. Regulation No. 2004-02
adopted by the French Banking and Financial
Regulations Committee substantially amends the
4 “Interagency Paper on Sound Practices to Strengthen the Resilience of the US Financial System”, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Securities and Exchange Commission, 4 April 2003.
5 “Tripartite Standing Committee on Financial Stability” composed of the Bank of England, the HM Treasury and the Financial Services Authority
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provisions contained in the previous regulation
No. 97-02. It requires that all credit institutions
set up adequate business continuity plans
covering all functional infrastructures. It also
strengthens the reporting requirements, both
internally (information to the Board for example)
and externally (through the annual report on risk
control).
At the same time, initiatives have been taken to
reassess the main infrastructures’ business
continuity plans and improve the compatibility and
interoperability of individual crisis arrangements,
as illustrated by the two following examples.
• The GSIT (Groupement pour un Système
interbancaire de télécompensation), the French
interbank clearing consortium in charge of the
retail system SIT, has started working on the issue
of “major risks”, in co-operation with participants
in the system. In addition to the quantification of
operational risk, work has focused on making GSIT
continuity plans compatible with those of its users,
and with each other. It has also led to changes in
the disaster procedure “plan de secours”, which
enables the system to operate in contingency mode
in the event of a total breakdown of the
telecommunications network.
• A Financial Crisis Steering Committee (Comité de
pilotage de crise de Place), has been set up at the
instigation of the French Banking Federation (FBF).
It is scheduled to meet half-yearly and is made up
of representatives of the operators of the main
payment and securities settlement systems, i.e. the
Banque de France, the Centre for Interbank Funds
Transfers (Centrale des règlements interbancaires),
LCH.Clearnet SA and Euroclear France. It makes
sure that all players have put in place adequate
contingency procedures and ensures their overall
consistency. It also aims to encourage financial
system operators to make recommendations to their
participants with a view to supporting the crisis
arrangements implemented within each institution.
Moreover, on the initiative of this committee, the
first industry-wide testing of a simultaneous move
of the main infrastructures to their contingency site
was successfully organised.
Ensuring the smooth functioning of securities clearing and settlement systems and payment systems in
a variety of crisis scenarios, including large-scale disasters, through the implementation of appropriate
business continuity plans is essential to financial stability. This has clearly been acknowledged by both the
system operators and the authorities in charge of their regulation and oversight. The main challenges to
be taken up in order to achieve this objective have been identified and, since 11 September 2001, many
initiatives have already been taken in the major financial centres.
In Europe, initiatives have so far been conducted at the national level and should in the future be
co-ordinated with a view to strengthening the resilience of the European financial system as a whole. The
Banque de France intends to fully contribute to this process.